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Limits on the Privity and Assignment of
Legal Malpractice Claims
Tom W. Bellt
An assault on privity has swept through much of tort law in
the United States, freeing plaintiffs to press charges of negligence
against even those with whom they have never had contractual re-
lations. With the exception of scattered pockets of resistance, this
movement has revolutionized the field of legal malpractice. Follow-
ing California's lead, many state courts no longer consider lack of
privity a bar to a party who has suffered the effects of an attor-
ney's malpractice.' At the same time, these courts have almost uni-
versally resisted another policy that would also free more parties to
press legal malpractice claims: allowing the clients of negligent at-
torneys to assign their claims to third parties.2 Here, too, Califor-
nia courts lead the way.
Courts have lowered the privity bar in order to open new
routes to the litigation of legal malpractice claims. In particular,
courts have relaxed privity requirements in order to advance three
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California's multi-factored balancing test of attorney liability to parties not in privity
first appeared in Biakanja v Irving, 49 Cal 2d 647, 320 P2d 16, 19 (1958), and was subse-
quently modified in Lucas v Hamm, 56 Cal 2d 583, 15 Cal Rptr 821, 364 P2d 685, 687-88
(1961). For an analysis of the widespread influence of these cases, see Ronald E. Mallen and
Jeffrey M. Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice § 7.11 at 383-84 (West, 3d ed 1989).
See, for example, Goodley v Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal App 3d 389, 133 Cal Rptr 83
(1976) (cause of action for legal malpractice claim held not assignable); Continental Casu-
alty Co. v Pullman, Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 709 F Supp 44, 50 n 7 (D Conn 1989) (citing
a collection of cases holding claims for legal malpractice not assignable).
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policy goals: providing remedies to victims of legal malpractice,
forcing negligent attorneys to bear the costs of their behavior, and
deterring further legal malpractice. Allowing claims to be assigned
would achieve similar results. It would encourage the development
of a market in legal malpractice claims, a market where victims
could find immediate redress and negligent attorneys would face
efficient enforcement mechanisms. But although the threat of be-
ing sued for legal malpractice haunts the thoughts of practicing at-
torneys (or perhaps because it does), the positive aspects of al-
lowing their assignment have not yet received serious considera-
tion.3 This Comment discusses whether arguments supporting the
abandonment of the privity requirement in legal malpractice
claims weigh in favor of allowing the assignment of such claims.4
Section I of the Comment describes how and why courts have
almost universally lowered the privity bar to legal malpractice
claims. Section II discusses the reluctance of courts to relax restric-
tions on the assignment of such claims. Section III shows how the
policies driving these two trends in the case law-lowering the
privity bar but forbidding assignment-are at odds with one an-
other. Section IV squares the arguments for disallowing assign-
ment with arguments for easing the privity requirement. It then
measures both trends against the policies of providing equitable
relief, apprehending malpracticing attorneys, deterring negligence,
protecting attorney-client relations, and protecting the legal sys-
tem from being overburdened. The Comment concludes that the
interests of consistency and public policy favor permitting vol-
3 Although several researchers have argued on behalf of the assignability of tort claims
in general, none of them have addressed legal malpractice claims in particular or compared
the effects of relaxing privity with allowing assignability. See, for example, Robert Cooter,
Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 Va L Rev 383 (1989) (developing a model
of a market for tort claims); Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims,
16 J Legal Stud 329 (1987) (outlining significant advantages that a market in personal in-
jury tort claims would offer to victims); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Set-
tlement, 16 J Legal Stud 189, 196-97 (1987) (arguing agency costs for settlement would
largely disappear if client could sell claim to attorney); Charles J. Goetz, Law and Econom-
ics 39-43 (West, 1984) (discussing economic advantages of allowing personal tort claims to
be assigned); Harold R. Weinberg, Tort Claims as Intangible Property: An Exploration
from an Assignee's Perspective, 64 Ky L J 49 (1975) (criticizing legal doctrines that disallow
assignment of personal tort claims).
4 The common law initially forbade the assignment of all choses in action. Courts grad-
ually eroded this rule, however, and allowed assignment of actions that survived the death
of the plaintiff. Weinberg, 64 Ky L J at 51-74 (cited in note 3). Some states have codified
this doctrine in statutes that allow most causes of action to be assigned-but not those
arising out of personal torts. See, for example, Cal Civ Code § 954 (West 1992); NY Gen
Oblig Law § 13-101 (McKinney 1992). Courts have relied on this distinction to deny that
legal malpractice claims can be assigned. See Section IV.B.2.
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untary assignments of legal malpractice claims while forbidding
involuntary (as opposed to both voluntary and nonvoluntary5) as-
signments that violate clients' rights to confidential relations with
their attorneys.
I. THE ASSAULT ON PRIVITY
The common law rule of strict privity once barred plaintiffs
from suing in tort on any claim arising outside of a contractual
relation. A sustained assault has weakened this rule, however, and
now many state courts allow parties not in privity to sue in tort on
legal malpractice claims.' Courts have generally justified the cur-
rent view by arguing that it provides remedies to victims of legal
malpractice, places losses on the responsible attorneys, and deters
culpable behavior.
Although a few states still resist the trend toward relaxing the
privity rule for legal malpractice claims, "the vast majority of mod-
ern decisions have favored expanding privity beyond the confines
of the attorney-client relationship."' State courts now use a variety
of standards for determining attorneys' liability to non-clients.
California's multi-factor balancing test, developed in the seminal
cases of Biakanja v Irving9 and Lucas v Hamm,10 has met with
widespread favor.11 California courts have also generated an alter-
native (and potentially conflicting) standard for legal malpractice
liability by extracting just one element from the multi-factor test
-foreseeability of harm. 2 This standard, however, has found little
5 See text accompanying notes 145-48.
See, for example, Lucas, 364 P2d at 687-88; Norman v Brown, Todd & Heyburn, 693
F Supp 1259 (D Mass 1988). Unlike assignability, the privity of legal malpractice claims has
drawn a fair amount of attention from legal scholars. For the most recent work on this topic,
see Jack I. Samet, et al, The Attack on the Citadel of Privity, 20 The Brief 9 (Winter 1991).
See also Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice ch 7 at 360-400 & 1991 Supp (cited in
note 1).
I See, for example, Auric v Continental Casualty Co., 111 Wis 2d 507, 331 NW2d 325,
328-29 (1983); Licata v Spector, 26 Conn Supp 378, 225 A2d 28, 30 (Ct Comm P1 1966);
Note, Extending Legal Malpractice Liability to Nonclients-The Washington Supreme
Court Considers the Privity Requirement-Bowman v. John Doe Two, 61 Wash L Rev 761,
766-69 (1986) (distilling these policy concerns out of cases from several jurisdictions).
' Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice § 7.10 at 379 (cited in note 1). See also Don-
ald B. Hilliker, Attorney Liability to Third Parties: A Look to the Future, 36 DePaul L Rev
41, 60-61 (1986) ("Only one case in the last several years has broken the trend to expand
third party liability for attorneys.").
- 49 Cal 2d 647, 320 P2d 16 (1958).
10 56 Cal 2d 583, 15 Cal Rptr 821, 364 P2d 685 (1961).
" See note 25 and accompanying text.
12 See for example, St. Paul Title Co. v Meier, 181 Cal App 3d 948, 226 Cal Rptr 538,
539 (1986); In re Rexplore, Inc., 685 F Supp 1132, 1146 (N D Cal 1988).
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support elsewhere. Most other states that have lowered the privity
bar to legal malpractice claims demand that non-clients be third-
party beneficiaries before giving them standing to sue. 13
A. From Privity Bar to Balancing Test
Winterbottom v Wright 4 set forth the common law rule of
strict privity, holding that no action for negligence could arise
outside of a contractual relation. The United States Supreme
Court followed suit in Savings Bank v Ward,15 but American
courts thereafter riddled the privity rule with exceptions. Justice
Cardozo led the way in what has become a famous line of opin-
ions. 6 Cardozo eventually tried to limit the trend toward ex-
panding liability, however, in a case where he observed that "[t]he
assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days
apace."' 7
Cardozo's observation aptly describes California law. Califor-
nia launched its first major assault on the privity bar to legal mal-
practice claims in Biakanja v Irving,' where the court allowed the
beneficiary of a will to sue the party who negligently prepared it.
Citing policy concerns,' 9 Biakanja abandoned the privity rule and
instead based standing on the outcome of a test balancing seven
factors. The test considered
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of cer-
tainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
'3 See, for example, Flaherty v Weinberg, 303 Md 116, 492 A2d 618, 625 (1985); Pel-
ham v Griesheimer, 92 Ill 2d 13, 64 Ill Dec 544, 440 NE2d 96, 99-101 (1982).
14 10 Meeson & Welsby 109, 115, in 62 Rev Rep 534, 538 (Ex 1842).
15 100 US 195, 203 (1879).
" See, for example, MacPherson v Buick Motor Company, 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050
(1916) (defendant manufacturer found liable for foreseeable injuries to parties lacking priv-
ity); Glanzer v Shepard, 233 NY 236, 135 NE 275 (1922) (public weigher held liable for
misrepresentation to buyers not in privity where their reliance was the end and aim of the
transaction). See Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation 107-15 (Chicago,
1990) (discussing this line of cases).
" Ultramares Corp. v Touche, 255 NY 170, 174 NE 441, 445 (1931) (barring suit for
negligence against public accountant by a party who was meant to benefit only incidentally
or collaterally from accountant's services, and was unknown to the accountant).
18 320 P2d 16.
"Although the court did not spell out its rationale, it appears to have relied upon the
traditional reasons for relaxing the privity barrier to legal malpractice claims: providing a
remedy to the victim, placing losses on the responsible attorney, and deterring culpable
behavior. See id at 19. See also Note, 61 Wash L Rev at 766-69 (cited in note 7).
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suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's con-
duct, and the policy of preventing future harm.2"
A few years later, in Lucas v Hamm, 21 the California Supreme
Court appeared to modify this list of factors. The court considered
an additional factor, not mentioned in Biakanja: whether there
would be an undue burden imposed on the legal system.22 Further-
more, the court failed to mention "the moral blame attached to a
defendant's conduct." Perhaps because both Lucas and Biakanja
left open the possibility of variations on their tests, the California
courts have not made much of the differences between the cases. 23
The courts continue to cite each case with roughly equal
frequency.2 '
Although the balancing test of legal malpractice liability de-
veloped in Biakanja and Lucas has proven popular throughout the
United States and has even received favorable notice in England,25
this test has not escaped criticism. A Pennsylvania court, for exam-
ple, rejected the balancing test on grounds that it "has proved un-
20 320 P2d at 19.
21 364 P2d 685.
22 Id at 687-88.
22 The Lucas court also broke new ground in allowing the plaintiff to recover under
contract law as a third-party beneficiary. Id at 689. Later, however, the California Supreme
Court dismissed this approach as "conceptually superfluous since the crux of the action
must lie in tort in any case; there can be no recovery without negligence." Heyer v Flaig, 70
Cal 2d 223, 74 Cal Rptr 225, 449 P2d 161, 164 (1969). Third-party beneficiary theory has
fared better in other states. See Section I.C.
Lucas agreed with Biakanja, however, in implicitly recognizing the policy issues at
stake: "plaintiffs would have received the intended benefits but for the asserted negligence
of defendant; and if persons such as plaintiffs are not permitted to recover.., the policy of
preventing future harm would be impaired." Lucas, 364 P2d at 688.
24 See, for example, Donald v Garry, 19 Cal App 3d 769, 97 Cal Rptr 191, 192 (quoting
Biakanja and citing Lucas); Schick v Lerner, 193 Cal App 3d 1321, 238 Cal Rptr 902, 906
(1987) (quoting Lucas and citing Biakanja). Shepardizing the cases via LEXIS on 10/10/92
showed Biakanja having received 152 citations by California courts, while Lucas had re-
ceived 168. A LEXIS search on the same date retrieved 44 cases citing both Biakanja and
Lucas.
2 The balancing test has been favorably received in at least some courts in Arizona,
Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois (but see Pelham,
440 NE2d 96), Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York (but see text accompanying notes 35-37), Oregon, Pennsylvania (but
see text accompanying note 26), Wisconsin, and England. Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Mal-
practice § 7.11 at 383-84 n 5 (cited in note 1). See also id at 383 ("The balancing test has
been cited with approval and accepted with near unanimity by those jurisdictions which
have examined the issue."). See also Note, 61 Wash L Rev at 763 (cited in note 7).
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workable, and has led to ad hoc determinations and inconsistent
results. 2
6
For a time, California minimized such concerns by refusing to
hold attorneys liable to third parties who had not been identified
to the attorney and who were harmed in arm's length dealings with
the attorney's clients.2 7 But California courts upset this neat ar-
rangement by developing a potentially conflicting test of legal mal-
practice liability: foreseeability of harm to third parties. As a re-
sult, the exact boundaries of legal malpractice liability in
California currently remain somewhat unclear.2 s
B. Protecting Foreseeably Injured Parties
In St. Paul Title Co. v Meier,29 a California appellate court
pared down the balancing test of attorney liability to focus atten-
tion on situations in which "the foreseeability of harm to the third
party as a consequence of professional negligence is not out-
weighed by other policy considerations." Pursuing this new route
to malpractice liability, a California federal district court found
that an attorney could be held liable for advice given to a client
when it was foreseeable that the client would use it to solicit po-
tential investors-even though the plaintiff investors were not yet
identified to the attorney. 0 In contrast to the balancing test, the
theory that liability for legal malpractice should correspond
strictly to foreseeable injuries has found very few followers outside
of California."
2' Guy v Liederbach, 501 Pa 47, 459 A2d 744, 749 (1983). See also Colaprico v Sun
Microsystems, Inc., 758 F Supp 1335, 1339 (N D Cal 1991) ("the test is too pliable, and thus
unreliable, for close cases"); Samet, 20 The Brief at 11 (cited in note 6).
27 Goodman v Kennedy, 18 Cal 3d 335, 134 Cal Rptr 375, 556 P2d 737, 743 (1976)
(third-party purchasers of stock barred from suing attorney who had advised corporate
officers). But see Roberts v Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal App 3d 104, 128 Cal
Rptr 901, 905 (1976) (attorney's liability reaches identified third parties intended to benefit
from his services).
28 Samet, 20 The Brief at 11 (cited in note 6).
2 181 Cal App 3d 948, 226 Cal Rptr 538, 539 (1986) (allowing attorney liability to reach
third parties harmed in dealing with clients at arm's length).
11 In re Rexplore, 685 F Supp 1132, 1144-46 (N D Cal 1988), following St. Paul Title
Co., 226 Cal Rptr 538.
" Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice § 7.12 at 390 (cited in note 1); Note, 61 Wash
L Rev at 763 n 22 (cited in note 7). But see Samet, 20 The Brief at 12 (cited in note 6), in
support of the foreseeability test's prevalence. Samet cites only cases from California and
Massachusetts in support of this claim, however, and the other jurisdictions discussed in the
same article reveal a decided preference for the intended-beneficiary test. Samet concludes
that most jurisdictions do not rely on the foreseeability test. Id at 12-13, 40.
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C. Intended Third-Party Beneficiary Theory
Despite the influence of California's legal experimentation,
most jurisdictions that have relaxed the privity bar use a third-
party beneficiary theory to limit the scope of legal malpractice lia-
bility to non-clients. In these jurisdictions, both the attorney and
the client must intend for their relationship to benefit a third
party for liability to that non-client to arise.3 2 Moreover, the intent
to benefit the non-client must be the "primary or direct purpose of
the transaction or relationship." 3
Why have courts applied the third-party beneficiary approach
to limit legal malpractice liability? Further relaxation of the priv-
ity bar
would have the undesirable effect of creating a duty to third
parties which would take precedence over an attorney's fiduci-
ary duty to his client. Public policy mandates that when an
attorney acts in his professional capacity, he must be free to
advise his client without fear of personal liability to third per-
sons and nonclients if the advice later proves to be incorrect.3 4
D. Privity's Last Strongholds
Ironically, the New York courts that launched the assault on
the privity rule during Cardozo's tenure are today some of its last
defenders. 5 A state's faith in the privity rule can be gauged by
looking at how it treats claims by would-be beneficiaries of wills,
sympathetic plaintiffs who stand ready and willing to defend testa-
tors' rights.3 6 In Viscardi v Lerner, the New York Appellate Divi-
sion "decline[d] to depart from the firmly established privity re-
" See, for example, Flaherty, 492 A2d at 625-27. Not all courts require an explicit
statement of an intent to benefit a third party, however. See, for example, Hale v Groce, 304
Or 281, 744 P2d 1289, 1292 (1987) (non-client plaintiff not named in will due to admitted
failure of testator's attorney given standing to sue as intended third-party beneficiary);
Stowe v Smith 184 Conn 194, 441 A2d 81, 83 (1981) (non-client plaintiff has standing to sue
attorney who contravened testator's instructions to leave plaintiff the principal of a testa-
mentary trust).
3' Pelham, 440 NE2d at 99-101.
3, Orr v Shepard, 171 Ill App 3d 104, 121 IlM Dec 57, 524 NE2d 1105, 1108 (1988) (cita-
tions omitted).
36 See, for example, Viscardi v Lerner, 125 AD2d 662, 510 NYS2d 183, 185 (1986) (af-
firming New York's traditional support of the strict privity rule in attorney malpractice
cases).
36 Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice § 7.10 at 379 (cited in note 1); Note, 61 Wash
L Rev at 764 (cited in note 7) ("Beneficiaries failing to take under invalid wills often present
compelling claims for relief.").
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quirement in order to create a specific exemption for an attorney's
negligence in will drafting."3 No more than a handful of other
states also stand by the strict privity rule when it would bar recov-
ery by third-party beneficiaries of wills. Only courts in Missouri,
Nebraska, Ohio, and Texas still treat the absence of privity as a
bar to recovery in such cases. 8 These exceptions notwithstanding,
most jurisdictions have either lowered the privity bar to legal mal-
practice claims or removed it altogether.3 9
II. THE CASE FOR RESTRICTIONS ON ASSIGNMENT OF LEGAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
Courts have for the most part frowned on the assignment of
legal malpractice claims, voicing concern that it threatens impor-
tant public policy interests. The policy interests cited tend to vary,
however, depending on whether a court addresses a voluntary as-
signment, such as one which would arise out of a free exchange for
mutual benefit, or an involuntary assignment, such as one arising
out of a court order for payment of a debt. Courts have generally
worried that allowing voluntary assignments of legal malpractice
claims would place undue burdens on attorneys and courts.40 Only
one court has offered any policy arguments to the contrary.4' With
regard to the involuntary assignment of legal malpractice claims,
however, attention has focused on protecting the interests of the
parties to the underlying cause.42
A. Voluntarily Assigned Claims
Although privity doctrine in the area of legal malpractice lia-
bility is fairly well developed, courts have seldom grappled with
510 NYS2d at 185. See also Rossi v Boehner, 116 AD2d 636, 498 NYS2d 318 (1986).
38 Williams v Bryan, Cave, McPheeters, McRoberts, 774 SW2d 847, 849 (Mo App
1989); Landrigan v Nelson, 227 Neb 835, 420 NW2d 313, 314 (1988); Lilyhorn v Dier, 214
Neb 728, 335 NW2d 554, 555 (1983); Simon v Zipperstein, 32 Ohio St 3d 74, 512 NE2d 636,
638 (1987); Dickey v Jansen, 731 SW2d 581, 582 (Tex App 1987). See also Helen Bishop
Jenkins, Privity-A Texas-Sized Barrier to Third Parties for Negligent Will Drafting-An
Assessment and Proposal, 42 Baylor L Rev 687, 697-98 (1990).
11 Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice § 7.10 at 379 (cited in note 1). See also Hil-
liker, 36 DePaul L Rev at 60 (cited in note 8).
40 See, for example, Goodley, 133 Cal Rptr at 86; Jackson v Rogers and Wells, 210 Cal
App 3d 336, 258 Cal Rptr 454, 460 (1989).
"' Hedlund Manufacturing Co., Inc. v Weiser, Stopler & Spivak, 517 Pa 522, 539 A2d
357, 359 (1988).
42 See, for example, Kracht v Perrin, Gartland & Doyle, 219 Cal App 3d 1019, 268 Cal
Rptr 637, 640 (1990).
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the voluntary assignability of legal malpractice claims. They have
allowed it even less frequently.
Goodley v Wank & Wank, Inc.,43 decided by a California ap-
pellate court, is the main source for the proposition that legal mal-
practice claims should not be assignable. The Goodley court held
that the unique nature of legal services and the attorney-client re-
lationship invoked public policy concerns precluding voluntary as-
signment.44 It described these public policy concerns at length in
an oft-quoted passage:
The almost certain end result of merchandizing such causes of
action is the lucrative business of factoring malpractice claims
which would encourage unjustified lawsuits against members
of the legal profession, generate an increase in legal malprac-
tice litigation, promote champerty and force attorneys to de-
fend themselves against strangers. The endless complications
and litigious intricacies arising out of such commercial activi-
ties would place an undue burden on not only the legal profes-
sion but the already overburdened judicial system, restrict the
availability of competent legal services, embarrass the attor-
ney-client relationship and imperil the sanctity of the highly
confidential and fiduciary relationship existing between attor-
ney and client.45
In Jackson v Rogers & Wells, 46 another -California appellate
court followed Goodley and expanded on its rationale. First, the
Jackson court expressed concern that assignment would impair at-
torney-client relations by enabling strangers or adversaries to take
11 62 Cal App 3d 389, 133 Cal Rptr 83 (1976). The court ignored a previous decision
that had let pass without comment a legal malpractice action brought by an assignee: Lysick
v Walcom, 258 Cal App 2d 136, 65 Cal Rptr 406 (1968).
" 133 Cal Rptr at 85-88.
46 Id at 87. This passage is quoted, for example, in Continental Casualty Co. v Pull-
man, Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 709 F Supp 44, 50-51 n 7 (1989); Brocato v Prairie State
Farmers Ins. Ass'n, 166 Ill App 3d 986, 520 NE2d 1200, 1202 (1988); Picadilly, Inc. v
Raikos, 582 NE2d 338, 342 (Ind 1991). The Goodley quote contains some seldom-heard
terms that merit definition. "Champerty" arises in a "bargain between a stranger and a
party to a lawsuit by which the stranger pursues the party's claim in consideration of receiv-
ing part of any judgment proceeds; it is one type of 'maintenance'...." Black's Law Dic-
tionary 231 (West, 6th ed 1990). "Maintenance" means "officious intermeddling in a lawsuit
by a non-party by maintaining, supporting or assisting either party, with money or other-
wise, to prosecute or defend the litigation." Id at 954. "Factoring" is "[t]he purchase of
accounts receivable [here legal claims] by a factor who thereby assumes the risk of loss for
some agreed discount." Id at 592. Finally, a "factor" is a "commercial agent to whom the
possession of personalty is entrusted by or for the owner, to be sold, for a compensation, in
pursuance of the agent's usual trade or business .... " Id.
11 210 Cal App 3d 336, 258 Cal Rptr 454 (1989).
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up clients' legal malpractice claims.4" The court theorized that this
threat might discourage an attorney from "pursuing vigorous advo-
cacy on behalf of his or her client" for fear of annoying the adver-
sary, who might seek vengeance by suing the attorney for malprac-
tice under an assignment of rights.48
Second, the Jackson court expressed concern that allowing le-
gal malpractice claims to be bought and sold would inevitably raise
attorneys' insurance premiums.49 Lastly, the Jackson court con-
tended that circumstances surrounding this assignment rendered
the claim "fraught with illogic." 50 The assignee in Jackson had op-
posed the assignor in a prior case and won an excessively large re-
covery due to the negligence of the assignor's attorney. By taking
up his former adversary's legal malpractice claim the assignee ar-
gued, in effect, that his prior recovery should have been
diminished.51
Most jurisdictions that have addressed the voluntary assign-
ment of legal malpractice claims have found the reasoning of
Goodley and Jackson persuasive. 2 In only a few cases have courts
allowed the voluntary assignment of legal malpractice claims.5 3
The opinions in these cases typically fail to identify reasons for
their conclusions, but the Pennsylvania case of Hedlund Manufac-
turing Co., Inc. v Weiser, Stapler & Spivak provides the notable
exception.54
" 258 Cal Rptr at 461-62.
48 Id at 461. The court apparently assumed that employer-insurers would purchase
their employee-clients' causes of action in settlement.
0 Id. This objection is addressed below along with the Goodley court's complaint-about
overburdening the legal profession and restricting the availability of competent legal aid.
See text accompanying notes 109-28.
80 Id.
81 Id at 461-62. See also Kracht, 268 Cal Rptr at 641 (legal malpractice claim against
defendant's attorney, when assigned to victorious plaintiff, requires her to aver that "To the
extent I was not entitled to recover [but did, because of defense counsel's negligence], I am
now entitled to recover").
82 See, for example, Schroeder v Hudgins, 142 Ariz 395, 690 P2d 114, 118-19 (Ct App
1984); Brocato, 520 NE2d at 1202; Coffey v Jefferson County Board of Education, 756
SW2d 155, 157 (Ky App 1988); Chaffee v Smith, 98 Nev 222, 645 P2d 966 (1982).
83 See, for example, Oppel v Empire Mutual Ins. Co., 517 F Supp 1305, 1307 (S D NY
1981) (distinguishing between "personal injury" and "only pecuniary" legal malpractice
claims; allowing the latter); McGill v Lazzaro, 62 Ill App 3d 151, 19 Ill Dec 501, 379 NE2d
16, 18 (1978) (citing the "general rule" that actions for fraud, negligence, or bad faith can be
assigned); American Hemisphere Marine Agencies, Inc. v Kreis, 40 Misc 2d 1090, 244
NYS2d 602, 603 (Sup Ct 1963).
84 517 Pa 522, 539 A2d 357 (1988). For an analysis of Hedlund see Recent Decisions:
Assignments-Attorney and Client, 27 Duquesne L Rev 851 (1989).
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In Hedlund, the plaintiff was assigned both the rights to a
patent and to a claim against the attorney who had filed the patent
late. Despite objections from the defendant-attorney, the Hedlund
court upheld the validity of the assignment of the legal malpractice
claim. It side-stepped Pennsylvania's strict privity rule by finding
that the assignee stood in the shoes of his assignor.55 While recog-
nizing the rule against assigning personal injury claims, the court
explained that "a claim for damages based upon legal malpractice
does not involve personal injury in that it arises out of negligence
and breach of contract, and the injury alleged concerns purely pe-
cuniary interests." 56 The court denied that allowing assignability
would harm the attorney-client relationship, explaining that in a
legal malpractice claim there is no attorney-client relationship to
protect.57 The Hedlund court concluded that public policy favored
allowing voluntary assignments.
B. Involuntarily Assigned Claims
The involuntary assignment of legal malpractice claims raises
issues not addressed in Goodley and Jackson, both of which con-
cerned assignments undertaken with the full consent of both as-
signor and assignee. Involuntary assignments take place by opera-
tion of law, and typically put the legal malpractice claim in the
hands of a deceased client's estate, a trustee or creditor in bank-
ruptcy, or a subrogating insurer. 8 Courts addressing these conven-
tional situations have generally allowed the involuntary assignment
of the legal malpractice claim at issue. For example, courts usually
permit a legal malpractice claim to vest in the estate of a deceased
client. 9 Most jurisdictions likewise accept involuntary assignments
in cases where a bankrupt's legal malpractice claim has become
part of his or her bankruptcy estate.00 Courts have also allowed
" 539 A2d at 358.
56 Id at 359.
657 Id.
8 Although "involuntary assignment" merits respect as a term of art, "nonvoluntary
assignment" would arguably serve better. See text accompanying notes 145-48.
" See, for example, Saltmarsh v Burnard, 151 Mich App 476, 391 NW2d 382 (1986);
McFail v Braden, 19 Ill 2d 108, 166 NE2d 46 (1960).
60 See, for example, Collins v Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 421 NW2d 136, 138-39
(Iowa 1988); DeLarco v DeWitt, 136 AD2d 406, 527 NYS2d 615, 616 (1988). But see
Christison v Jones, 83 Ill App 3d 334, 39 Ill Dec 560, 405 NE2d 8, 11-12 (1980) (following
Goodley; treating assignment of malpractice claim to a bankrupt's estate as no different
than assignment of the claim to anyone else).
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insurers to subrogate legal malpractice claims, though with less
consistency.6'
The California appellate court in Kracht v Perrin, Gartland &
Doyle6 2 addressed a less conventional sort of involuntary assign-
ment. The assignment took place under compulsion of a court or-
der designed to satisfy debts the assignor owed the assignee. The
Kracht court argued that the involuntary nature of the assignment
presented two unique threats to public policy. First, a malpractice
claim might be filed despite opposition from a client who had no
complaints about legal services he or she had received. 3 Second,
the involuntary assignment of a legal malpractice claim could un-
fairly prejudice "either the attorney (by precluding any defense
based on privileged communications) or the client (by permitting
the assignee to waive the privilege without the client's consent). ' 4
Valid or not, these arguments concern only assignments of the sort
before the Kracht court. As noted below, more conventional types
of assignments merit a different and more lenient treatment.6 5
III. THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT
The conflict between lowering the privity bar to legal malprac-
tice claims and restricting the assignability of legal malpractice
claims arises because the arguments that courts cite in favor of the
former disfavor the latter. Conversely, the courts' arguments for
disallowing assignability work against relaxing the privity bar.
The tension between these two bodies of case law appears
clearly whether viewed from the perspective of either privity or as-
signability. From the perspective of privity, courts aim to fulfill a
number of policies by relaxing the privity bar to legal malpractice
claims: providing remedies to victims of legal malpractice, making
responsible attorneys bear the costs, and deterring culpable behav-
ior.6 Permitting voluntary assignments would satisfy each of these
policies to a degree comparable to or greater than would relaxing
61 See, for example, Great Atlantic Insurance Co. v Weinstein, 125 AD2d 214, 509
NYS2d 325 (1986) (allowing the subrogation of a legal malpractice claim to pass without
comment). But see American Employer's Insurance Co. v Medical Protective Co., 165 Mich
App 657, 419 NW2d 447, 448-49 (1988) (assignment refused on grounds that attorney would
fail to represent clients zealously if made liable to both them and their insurers).
82 219 Cal App 3d 1019, 268 Cal Rptr 637 (1990).
3 268 Cal Rptr at 640.
" Id at 641 n 6. The court cited no evidence, however, that the client had actually
objected to the malpractice suit or to the waiver of attorney-client privilege.
"5 See Section IV.B.7.
66 See, for example, Biakanja, 320 P2d at 19; Lucas, 364 P2d at 688.
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the privity rule, while producing no adverse consequences suffi-
cient to justify prohibiting the practice.8
From the perspective of assignability, few of the arguments
made against the assignment of legal malpractice claims stand up
to close scrutiny. When not entirely amiss, these arguments speak
with equal or greater force against lowering the privity bar. For the
most part, then, relaxing the privity requirement and allowing as-
signability stand or fall by the same arguments. To reconcile these
bodies of case law, this Comment argues that courts should lower
the privity bar only enough to allow claims by intended benefi-
ciaries and should abolish current barriers to voluntary assign-
ments. Relaxing the privity rule does, however, sometimes influ-
ence legal malpractice claims in different ways than allowing
assignability would. More often than not, these differences favor
the latter policy. But they also demonstrate that lowering the priv-
ity bar serves special ends.
The most important difference between lowering the privity
bar and allowing assignability relates to the efficiency with which
these policies resolve legal malpractice claims. As discussed in Sec-
tion IV, allowing voluntary assignability would promote the opti-
mal enforcement of legal rights by putting them in the hands of
the parties who value them most. 8
Another difference between lowering the privity bar and al-
lowing assignability is that the former may greatly expand the
class of plaintiffs who have standing to bring legal malpractice
claims. For example, in In re Rexplore, Inc., the court gave stand-
ing to third-party investors, whom the defendant-attorney did not
know, on the grounds that they suffered foreseeable harms from
arms-length dealings with a client acting on the attorney's advice. 9
Lowering the privity bar to this extent may make it difficult for
attorneys to ascertain to whom, and thus to what extent, they will
be held liable for their errors. Many defendants are surprised by
what courts judge to have been foreseeable. Allowing assignment,
in contrast, leaves the criteria for legal malpractice unaffected.
Although relaxing the privity bar might promise standing to
sympathetic plaintiffs more frequently than expanding assignabil-
ity would, the policy should not be taken too far. Fairness de-
67 See text accompanying notes 84-96.
68 See text accompanying notes 87-88. To a lesser degree the same is also true of one
class of involuntary claims, described below as "nonvoluntary." See text accompanying
notes 145-48.
69 685 F Supp 1132, 1146 (N D Cal 1988).
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mands that attorneys be held liable for harms inflicted on their
clients' intended beneficiaries. But public policy demands that at-
torneys' liability to non-clients go no further.70 Voluntary assigna-
bility offers no more standing to third-party beneficiaries than
they are willing to purchase, but it promotes fairness by another
route: it helps to ensure that victims of legal malpractice know
their rights and that they obtain relief quickly and easily.7 1
The temptation to portray relaxing the privity bar as only an
equitable policy and allowing assignability as only an efficient one
should therefore be resisted. Just as voluntary assignability speaks
to more than efficiency, courts do not relax privity requirements
just to give standing to every sympathetic party who complains
about legal malpractice. 2 Instead, they aim at broader poli-
cies-policies with respect to which assignability often offers dis-
tinct advantages.73
IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
Broadly speaking, courts can resolve the conflict that arises
from simultaneously relaxing privity requirements and disallowing
assignability either by abandoning one policy or by withdrawing
from both to reach a comfortable medium. Simply resurrecting
the privity bar would leave many policy concerns unaddressed and
run against prevailing jurisprudential trends. Nonetheless, the un-
certainty generated by California's balancing test shows the
hazards of taking the assault on privity too far. 4 Courts ought to
lower the privity bar only low enough to let intended beneficiaries
pass.
10 See Orr, 524 NE2d at 1108 ("Public policy mandates that when an attorney acts in
his professional capacity, he must be free to advise his client without fear of personal liabil-
ity to third persons and nonclients if the advice later proves to be incorrect.").
71 See text accompanying notes 90-94.
712 See, for example, Goodman v Kennedy, 18 Cal 3d 335, 134 Cal Rptr 375, 556 P2d
737, 743-44 (1976). One might even argue that courts have acted efficiently in relaxing priv-
ity requirements for legal malpractice claims on the grounds that legal services are fre-
quently "credence goods"-that is, consumers find it difficult to determine their value even
after substantial use. A lawyer is far better placed to evaluate and insure against the risks of
using the lawyer's legal services than is a client or third parties. For an analogous discussion
with regard to product liability, see William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Eco-
nomic Structure of Tort Law 284-88 (Harvard, 1987).
11 Such policies include providing remedies to victims of legal malpractice, forcing neg-
ligent attorneys to bear the costs of their behavior, and deterring legal malpractice. See text
accompanying note 7.
74 See text accompanying notes 25-26.
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If courts have given the merits of privity too little respect,
they have virtually ignored the merits of assignability. Allowing
the voluntary assignment of legal malpractice claims would serve
the same policies that courts have voiced to justify relaxing the
privity bar-with even greater efficiency.7 5 The charges that courts
have launched against voluntary assignability fail to stand up to
close scrutiny. But like the assault on privity, the loosening of re-
strictions on assignability ought not be allowed to go too far.
Courts should guard against the sorts of abuse to which all assigna-
ble claims are susceptible and prohibit involuntary assignments of
legal malpractice claims that would violate the confidentiality of
attorney-client relations. With these checks in place, however, al-
lowing greater assignability of legal malpractice claims promises to
bring about gains in both efficiency and equity.
A. Resurrecting the Privity Bar
Resurrecting the privity bar would give courts one means of
avoiding the apparent conflict between policy arguments for re-
laxing privity and policy arguments for restricting assignment. Ab-
sent other measures, however, this would abandon the policy goals
that justified lowering the privity bar in the first place. Courts are
thus understandably reluctant to return to the strict privity bar.76
As even California courts have recognized, however, exces-
sively relaxing privity sacrifices other important policy goals.
Overextending legal malpractice liability to parties not in privity
undermines certainty in judicial decisionmaking by replacing the
square corners obtainable in a contractual relationship with com-
plex balancing tests and disputable determinations regarding fore-
seeability. The resulting uncertainty promotes wasteful litigation
between parties unable to settle on objective valuations of mal-
practice claims, 7 and discourages attorneys from zealously repre-
senting their clients by raising the spectre of liability to third par-
ties. 8 Courts can account for these concerns by allowing the
voluntary assignment of legal malpractice claims, rather than as-
saulting privity. Assignability makes attorneys bear the costs of
their actions and deters further malpractice even better than re-
7' Again, the same is true of nonvoluntary assignments, but to a lesser degree. See text
accompanying notes 145-48.
76 See text accompanying notes 6-13.
7 See text accompanying notes 84-87.
78 See Orr, 524 NE2d at 1108; Hiliker, 36 DePaul L Rev at 63 (cited in note 8); Note,
61 Wash L Rev at 777 (cited in note 7).
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laxing the privity rule.79 Allowing voluntary assignability also helps
victims of legal malpractice to secure remedies.8 0 Yet assignability
carries few of the negatives that follow overly ambitious assaults
on privity.
Only with regard to granting legal standing does relaxing priv-
ity requirements offer special tools for dealing with legal malprac-
tice. But to avoid the hazards of overextending attorney liability,
courts should lower the privity bar only when they. can preserve
clear boundaries to attorney liability, when clients will not bring
suit, and when equity demands. Among current -approaches to
privity, only the intended beneficiary test meets these standards.8
Courts should adopt this test, but once they have applied it to es-
tablish who has legal- standing to sue for legal malpractice, they
should forget privity and employ the most effective tool for cor-
recting, punishing, and deterring legal malpractice: allowing volun-
tary assignments.
B. Allowing the Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims
Relaxing restrictions on voluntary assignability offers courts
the best means of escaping the inconsistency of lowering the priv-
ity bar to legal malpractice claims while simultaneously restricting
their assignability. Furthermore, by bringing market reforms to the
legal system, allowing the voluntary assignment of legal malprac-
tice claims would improve the efficiency and equity of mechanisms
for correcting and preventing legal malpractice.
Allowing parties to assign voluntarily their legal malpractice
claims promises to ease overall burdens on the legal system. Under
the present system, plaintiffs lacking information about the value
of their claims will often take them to court in ignorance of
whether their litigation costs will exceed their returns."2 Voluntary
assignability can reduce such litigation by educating potential
plaintiffs about the value of their claims.8 3 It would permit a com-
11 See text accompanying notes 87-88.
80 See text accompanying notes 90-94.
81 See section I.C.
82 A great deal of scholarship has developed around the question of why parties litigate.
See, for example, Samuel R. Gross and Kent P. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settle-
ment Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 Mich L Rev 319 (1991); George
L. Priest, Issues in Civil Procedure: Advancing the Dialogue, 69 BU L Rev 527 (1989);
George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Legal
Stud 1 (1984).
83 To a lesser degree the same is true of that class of involuntary assignments described
below as being nonvoluntary. See text accompanying notes 145-48.
1548 [59:1533
Legal Malpractice Claims
petitive market in legal malpractice claims to arise, and thus gen-
erate information about the value of claims by ascribing them
prices.8 4 Assignability would foster a more objective valuation of
claims 'drawing on the expertise of specialists in such estimations.
This would encourage settlement because parties will tend to ar-
rive at more uniform valuations."
Allowing voluntary assignability may also provide an optimally
efficient mechanism for enforcing laws against legal malpractice.,6
A market in legal malpractice claims would tend to place them in
the hands of the parties who value them most.87 In cases in which
these parties are not defendant-lawyers settling out of court, they
will be the parties most willing and able to litigate the claims. By
encouraging private parties to enforce legal malpractice laws, al-
lowing voluntary assignability will thus force negligent attorneys to
bear the costs of their actions and deter other attorneys from en-
gaging in malpractice.
Market reform of the legal system would increase its equity as
well as its efficiency. Tort victims seeking compensation from
tortfeasors usually find themselves in a distinctly poor bargaining
position. 8 They may need immediate funds due to the losses they
have suffered. They may also lack the expertise to evaluate realisti-
cally their legal options."9 This holds especially true of the victims
of legal malpractice, who are likely to square off against opponents
more wealthy and skilled than themselves.
A market in legal malpractice claims already exists, in a sense,
but it is a monopsony where only defendant-attorneys have the
right to purchase the claims brought against them (by settling out
of court). Opening this market to third parties would eliminate the
unfair advantage currently held by attorneys guilty of malpractice,
who can threaten their victims with the choice between a low set-
84 See Goetz, Law and Economics at 42 (cited in note 3) (discussing the information
generating benefits of a market created by contingency fees and subrogation); Weinberg, 64
Ky L J at 75 (cited in note 3).
85 Goetz, Law and Economics at 43. See also Cooter, 75 Va L Rev at 397-98 (cited in
note 3). Both sources describe the settlement of tort claims generally, though by extension
their observations apply to legal malpractice claims.
88 An argument by analogy from Cooter, 75 Va L Rev at 396-400. See also Shukaitis, 16
J Legal Stud at 341 (cited in note 3); Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plain-
tiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U Chi L Rev 1, 105-16 (1991).
"I See Macey and Miller, 58 U Chi L Rev at 110 (referring to a market in class action
and derivative claims); Goetz, Law and Economics at 43 (cited in note 3) (referring to a
market in tort claims generally).
" Shukaitis, 16 J Legal Stud at 334-35 (cited in note 3).
89 Id at 337.
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tlement and an expensive court battle.90 Under a system allowing
assignment, such attorneys would not continue to enjoy the unfair
advantages of wealth and expertise, for to settle the claims against
them they would have to bid more than competing purchasers.9'
Such competition would help to inform victims of legal malpractice
of their rights and offer them immediate compensation. 2
Courts already allow the assignment of most property and
contract-related claims and of many types of tort claims.93 They
thus have readily adaptable tools for dealing with the abuses that
might accompany the voluntary assignment of legal malpractice
claims. As for involuntary assignments, courts are already learning
to screen out those that threaten the confidentiality of attorney-
client relations. 4 This Section criticizes the arguments that courts
have brought to bear against the assignability of legal malpractice
claims and argues that assignability offers far more benefits than
liabilities.
1. Unique nature of the legal profession.
The Goodley court disallowed the assignment of legal mal-
practice claims due to the "uniquely personal nature of legal ser-
vices. ' 95 The Supreme Court, however, has argued against shelter-
ing lawyers from market forces. In Bates v State Bar of Arizona,
the Court explained that "the belief that lawyers are somehow
'above' trade has become an anachronism." ''" In so arguing, the
Court "acknowledged the obvious once and for all-that lawyering
is a business .... "19
90 See id at 336; Cooter, 75 Va L Rev at 404 (cited in note 3).
91 As discussed above, this bidding process may result in victims being offered the
"true" value of their claims. Would it result in "fair" offers? That depends on whether
courts treat victims of legal malpractice fairly, since the offers they get for their claims track
what they would get in court. But assignability deserves none of the credit or blame on this
count.
'2 See Shukaitis, 16 J Legal Stud at 334-38 (cited in note 3) (referring to a market in
personal tort claims).
'3 See, for example, Osuna v Albertson, 134 Cal App 3d 71, 184 Cal Rptr 338, 345
(1982); Weinberg, 64 Ky L J at 74-78 (cited in note 3); Goetz, Law and Economics at 39
(cited in note 3).
"' See text accompanying notes 64-65.
9' 133 Cal Rptr at 86.
g 433 US 350, 371-72 (1977) (striking down prohibitions on attorney advertising). But
see Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 US 447, 460 (1978) (although self-employed busi-
ness agents, lawyers are also trusted agents of their clients and assistants to the court).
"' Duncan A. McDonald, Speculations by a Customer About the Future of Large Law
Firms, 64 Ind L J 593, 594 n 4 (1989). See also Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Profession
to a Business, 41 Vand L Rev 741 (1988).
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The arguments of the Goodley court merit little regard insofar
as they merely ask that lawyers get special protection from the rig-
ors of a market in legal malpractice claims. Why should lawyers get
privileged treatment? As will be discussed below, sheltering law-
yers from assigned claims serves neither clients nor the legal
system.98
2. Legal malpractice as a personal tort.
In Goodley, the court explained that "the personal nature of
the attorney's duty to the client" triggers public policy concerns
precluding the assignment of legal malpractice claims.9 Describing
legal malpractice claims in this manner allowed the Goodley court
to subject them to the common law rule that forbids the assign-
ment of personal injury claims. 00
Legal malpractice, however, need not be considered solely a
personal tort. Because a client's injury typically consists of pecuni-
ary rather than physical harms and arises out of a contractual rela-
tion, at least one court has explicitly classified legal malpractice as
a tort against property.' 0 ' Other courts seem prepared to do the
same.10 2 Even the Goodley court left this possibility open. 10 3
Because legal malpractice claims mix the qualities of personal
torts and torts against property, courts should not automatically
classify them only by reference to the former. Most courts allow
parties not in privity to recover for injuries due to legal malprac-
tice. Many will even let a complete stranger to the attorney bring
suit. 0 4 Courts can thus scarcely maintain that legal malpractice is
inherently personal.
Even if courts persist in categorizing legal malpractice claims
as personal torts, the traditional rule of non-assignability still
should not apply. Support has grown for repealing the rule alto-
" See text accompanying notes 108-35.
99 133 Cal Rptr at 87.
100 Id at 84-87. This is an exception to the general rule favoring the assignment of non-
personal injury claims. See text accompanying note 95.
"I Hedlund, 539 A2d at 359 (citations omitted).
101 See, for example, Christison v Jones, 83 111 App 3d 334, 405 NE2d 8, 11 (1980).
lo 133 Cal Rptr at 87.
[T]he personal nature of the duty owed to the client does not perforce convert the
breach thereof to a "tort of a purely personal nature" . . . but neither does the
damage alleged to be a direct consequence of defendants' negligent breach of duty
convert it to a claim "for property damages" arising out of a "non-personal tort"
that is freely assignable.
See, for example, In re Rexplore, 685 F Supp at 1143-47.
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gether.10 5 Modern commentators who have examined the issue
agree that "[t]he reasons that may have once supported restricting
the transferability of tort claims, such as the fear of maintenance
and difficulties in valuation, are not persuasive in contemporary
society."106 Perhaps such comments herald the final steps in a long
term trend toward allowing the free assignability of all causes of
action. 0 1
3. Fear of a market in legal malpractice claims.
In Goodley, the court expressed concern that an open market
in legal claims would put an undue burden on both the legal sys-
tem and the legal profession by encouraging unjustified litiga-
tion. 108 This argument is open to attack on a number of fronts.
First, the Goodley court's argument appears to prove too
much. It applies to the assignability of any sort of legal claim, in-
cluding those currently considered assignable. 09 The court gives no
reason to fear that legal malpractice claims will generate more ille-
gitimate suits than alternative claims that are already freely as-
signable. In any case, the proper remedy is not to completely for-
bid the assignment of legal malpractice claims but to create
stricter requirements for them or to enforce pre-existing con-
straints on frivolous litigation more rigorously. 10
Second, the Goodley court's concern that allowing assignabil-
ity would release a flood of legal malpractice claims seems ill-con-
sidered, given that the assault on privity may already have had a
more profound effect on the number of legal malpractice claims
brought before the court."' Relaxing the privity rule increases liti-
105 Although no one has addressed the particular benefits of allowing the assignability
of legal malpractice claims, the arguments of commentators addressing the assignability of
tort claims in general provide guidance. See note 3.
10' Weinberg, 64 Ky L J at 98 (cited in note 3). See also Shukaitis, 16 J Legal Stud at
348-49 (cited in note 3).
10I See, for example, Osuna, 184 Cal Rptr at 345 ("the tendency of modern jurispru-
dence strongly favors the assignability... of things in action") (emphasis in original), citing
Estate of Baker, 170 Cal 578, 150 P 989, 993 (1915).
10" 133 Cal Rptr at 87.
109 Such as most property and contract claims and most tort claims not arising out of a
personal injury. See note 4 and text accompanying note 95.
I" Courts might, for example, sanction the attorney via FRCP 11 or draw the bar's
attention to violations of the Model Rules. See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 3.1 ("[a] lawyer shall not bring a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous").
" The available data supports this hypothesis. The percentage of legal malpractice
claims initiated by non-clients to all legal malpractice claims more than doubled in the pe-
riod from 1979 to 1985, beginning at 7% and ending at 19%. Standing Committee on Law-
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gation by creating claims where none would otherwise exist and
increasing the number of parties to already existing claims. These
effects would greatly subside if the privity bar were lowered only
enough to let intended beneficiaries pass-a reform suggested as
complementary to that of allowing voluntary assignments.
In contrast, permitting the voluntary assignment of legal mal-
practice claims should have a small or negative impact on the
number of cases litigated. Because permitting the voluntary assign-
ment of legal malpractice claims will tend to put them in the
hands of the parties who value them most, the concern that expert
attorneys will snap them up in the expectation of litigating them
for profit may be justified. 112 Assignability might thus bring a short
term marginal increase in the number of legal malpractice claims
brought to court."' In the long term, however, "the increased effi-
ciency of the system should improve deterrence and therefore de-
crease the level of tortious activity.""14 And as noted earlier, the
information generated by a market in legal malpractice claims
would encourage parties to avoid litigation costs and settle out of
court. 15 Considering the sum of these effects, voluntary assignabil-
ity should put few or no additional burdens on the legal system.',,
Ultimately the concern should not be with the mere number of
claims, but with the virtues of those that make it to court and with
the risk that valid complaints will not get there at all. Justice de-
mands that legitimate claims be heard. As noted earlier, courts
that fear meritless suits should set stricter requirements for legal
malpractice claims without regard to their origins. 1 7 Tightening
yers' Professional Liability, Profile of Legal Malpractice: Report of the National Legal
Malpractice Data Center 44-48 (American Bar Association, 1986). This same period saw
widespread experimentation with the California balancing test. Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal
Malpractice § 7.11 at 383-84 n 5 (cited in note 1). In California itself, non-client claims
averaged 14.7% of all legal malpractice claims during the period from 1981 to 1985, versus a
national average of 13.3% during that period. Standing Committee on Lawyers' Professional
Liability, Characteristics of Legal Malpractice at 105, 111 (American Bar Association,
1989).
"2 If the defendant does not purchase a claim the highest bidder will probably be the
most qualified prosecutor. A claim is generally worth more to one more likely to gain from
litigating it. See Macey and Miller, 58 U Chi L Rev at 110 (cited in note 87) (discussing a
proposed market in class action and derivative claims).
113 Id. See also Shukaitis, 16 J Legal Stud at 343-44 (cited in note 3) (discussing the
assignability of personal tort claims).
114 Shukaitis, 16 J Legal Stud at 343 (referring to a market in personal tort claims).
i' See text accompanying notes 82-85.
1' See Shukaitis, 16 J Legal Stud at 343-44 (cited in note 3). See also Goetz, Law and
Economics at 43 (cited in note 3) (discussing the impact of allowing the assignment of tort
claims in general).
117 See text accompanying note 111.
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lax privity rules ought to help.118 Allowing voluntary assignments,
on the other hand, would provide the best means of ensuring that
victims of legal malpractice learn their rights and attract the par-
ties most qualified to protect them."9 Parties with most other sorts
of enforceable legal claims have won the benefits of assignability.1
20
Victims of legal malpractice deserve similar treatment.
In Jackson, the court expressed concern that allowing the as-
signability of legal malpractice claims would increase burdens on
the legal profession by raising lawyers' insurance costs.12' But in-
creased insurance rates do not necessarily make for poor policy. To
the contrary, they may help to strike a balance between spreading
the costs of negligent behavior widely enough to ensure that vic-
tims receive adequate recompense and pinning blame on responsi-
ble parties by raising their rates. 2 2 A market in legal malpractice
claims may establish the price signals necessary to strike this
balance. 23
The Goodley court also objected to reforming the market for
legal malpractice claims on the grounds that doing so would "de-
base the legal profession. ' ' 121 But the legal profession's privileged
status has already crumbled.' 25 And the array of benefits that
would come from allowing legal malpractice claims to be assigned
puts the burden of proof on those who would exempt the legal pro-
fession from market forces. It is not clear why the legal profession
deserves special protection from a mechanism that would prove
both efficient and equitable.
One way to explain, but not justify, restrictions on the assign-
ment of legal malpractice claims is by analyzing the interests of the
legal profession. Although a few attorneys would profit from the
freedom to purchase these claims, every attorney would face
greater risks of being caught for malpractice. This may give the bar
as a whole strong reasons to oppose the voluntary assignability of
legal malpractice claims. 26 Proposals to allow the voluntary assign-
118 See text accompanying note 77.
11 See text accompanying notes 89-93.
120 See note 4 and text accompanying note 93.
21 258 Cal Rptr at 461.
121 See, for example, International Mortgage Co. v John P. Butler Accountancy Corp.,
177 Cal App 3d 806, 223 Cal Rptr 218, 227 (1986) (discussing the effects of holding account-
ants liable for professional malpractice).
12I Cooter, 75 Va L Rev at 396 (cited in note 3).
12, 133 Cal Rptr at 87.
121 See text accompanying notes 96-98.
126 But note that especially good lawyers might, if they thought the matter through,
realize that they could gain from a legal regime that more effectively distinguishes them
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ability of legal malpractice claims might thus face the opposition of
a powerful and highly motivated special interest group.127
4. Effects on the attorney's diligence.
The court in Jackson also worried that the voluntary assign-
ment of legal malpractice claims might have an adverse effect on
attorney-client relations. According to the court, this relationship
"could be impaired if the attorney perceives a future threat of the
client's assignment to a stranger or adversary. 1 28 The court be-
lieved that an attorney might not be as diligent as he otherwise
would be if he fears that such diligence might alienate an adver-
sary who might then sue him for malpractice under an assignment
of rights. 29
Yet courts have better tools for ensuring vigorous advocacy
than issuing blanket prohibitions against assignability. State ethics
codes incorporating the ABA's Model Rules or Code'30 should suf-
fice to convince attorneys that half-hearted advocacy affords an ex-
traordinarily poor means of avoiding legal malpractice.' 3 ' Volun-
tary assignability will render these and other sanctions against
malpractice doubly effective by exposing attorneys to the scrutiny
of both the victim-client and his assignees.
Although allowing legal malpractice claims to be voluntarily
assigned will probably increase the efficiency with which those
claims are pursued, this does not mean that assignment presents
greater risks to attorneys than does lowering the privity bar. Some
from their less skilled counterparts. This goes to show that a rigorous public choice analysis
of the bar's stance toward the assignment of legal malpractice claims would have to account
for a complex range of factors.
127 Note that this argument applies more forcefully with regard to legal malpractice
than with regard to tort claims in general. See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller,
Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex L Rev 469, 506-07
(1987) (the bar is an especially well organized, wealthy, and politically powerful interest
group).
128 258 Cal Rptr at 461.
129 Id.
13O See, for example, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.3 ("A lawyer
shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."), Rule 1.8
("Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions"); ABA Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, DR 6-101(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him), DR 7-
101(A)(1) (a lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client
through reasonably available means).
1 How effective are such provisions? Clients do often succeed in forcing attorneys to
pay for lax representation. Of all awards claimants won from 1983 to 1985, 8.67% arose from
complaints of inadequate discovery or investigation. Standing Committee, Characteristics of
Legal Malpractice at 80 (cited in note 111).
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evidence suggests that relaxing privity errs on the side of allowing
too many illegitimate legal malpractice claims. 132 But assignability
might generate objective information about the viability of claims,
in the form of evaluations by specialists. 133 Such market-like valua-
tions would provide objective information to plaintiffs whose initial
subjective valuations of their claims are too high. 34 Assignability
should, therefore, lead to less litigation of unjustified claims and
help to lower attorneys' risks of facing unjustified accusations of
legal malpractice. Such a reform would probably have a more posi-
tive impact on lawyers than on other classes of potential defend-
ants; because lawyers value their reputations highly, they are par-
ticularly averse to risking accusations of malpractice. 3 5 More
importantly, reducing unfounded claims would draw out distinc-
tions between good and bad lawyers, thus encouraging malpractice
insurers to offer premiums rewarding the latter and punishing the
former.
5. Illogic of championing an opponent's cause.
The court in Jackson felt that the position of an assignee
pressing his opponent's malpractice claim is "fraught with illogic"
because "he in effect claims his own recovery.., should have been
diminished.' 3 s6 More generally, the problem is one of fighting the
battles of a former opponent. The assignor pressing a former oppo-
nent's claim must show that the underlying action should have had
232 Consider that non-clients bringing legal malpractice claims squeeze disproportion-
ately small sums out of attorneys' insurers. During the period from 1983 to 1985 non-clients
received 19.1% of all insurance claim payments between $0 and $1,000, 10.1% of those be-
tween $1,001 and $5,000, and less than 8.7% in any higher bracket. Id at 63. Furthermore,
84.9% of non-clients receiving insurance claim payments received between $0 and $1,000,
compared to 67.0% of clients. Id. California, the litmus for judging the effects of relaxing
privity, saw 19.2% of its legal malpractice claims dismissed in the years 1981 to 1985, versus
a national average of 17.4%. Id at 132, 139. Thus, even though there is no record of what
percentage of non-client claims were dismissed, the data available suggests that parties not
in privity tend to bring invalid claims.
133 See Goetz, Law and Economics at 43 (cited in note 3) (making similar argument
with regard to tort claims generally).
134 Id.
"I5 If the bar presents such a powerful special interest group, why has it not acted on
this theory? It may be too subtle an effect to have drawn the bar's attention. Or, even if it
has, the bar may be deterred from action because it can enjoy the full benefits of assignabil-
ity only if courts raise the privity bar. Attorneys may have a general preference for lax
privity rules, which create more litigants.
I'6 258 Cal Rptr at 461.
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an outcome more favorable to the assignee and less favorable to
the assignor." 7
What peril such "illogic" poses, however, is unclear. When an
assignee presses a malpractice claim against a former opponent in
a case where the assignee had won, the assignee does not put the
former judgment at risk. Collateral estoppel protects the judgment
that gave rise to the malpractice claim from being reversed later in
a legal malpractice hearing. 3 "
Perhaps the Jackson court was concerned that the assignee
would face a conflict of interest leading the assignee to contradict
or dilute the claims originally made against the former adversary,
who is now the assignor. Transcripts from the original trial and the
doctrine of estoppel provide the legal tools to prevent such hypoc-
risy, and an attorney facing legal malpractice claims brought by
the assignee would have every incentive to wield these tools in
defense.3 9
Perhaps the Jackson court worried that allowing an assignee
to subsequently press both sides of a case would lend the law an
unseemly air of paradox. But this argument proves too much. If
the risk of paradox sufficed to discourage legal malpractice litiga-
tion, there would be no such litigation at all.
The litigation of a legal malpractice action often thrusts the
parties, the judge and the jury into a virtual fantasy world of
hypothetical questions of fact and law with assumed plaintiffs
and defendants facing theoretical claims of liability and using
evidence which is not quite what it seems .... The ultimate
irony is that the attorney [accused of malpractice] is forced
into an adversary position and may oppose the merits of a
cause [] he once advocated.'40
In defense of the Jackson court, one might contrast an attor-
ney forced to defend against a legal malpractice claim and the as-
signee of such a claim who chooses to step into the shoes of the
erstwhile opponent. If courts regard avoiding paradoxes as a vital
concern, this distinction might justify forbidding parties from vol-
untarily contributing to the problem. But avoiding illogic is at best
SMalen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice § 16.1 at 890-91 (cited in note 1).
Mallen and Smith, 2 Legal Malpractice § 17.13 at 54 (cited in note 1).
See, for example, Hurd v DiMento & Sullivan, 440 F2d 1322, 1323 (1st Cir 1971)
(client suing attorneys for failure to prosecute action estopped from claiming they had
agreed to represent her where she had previously sought the action's continuance based on
her statement that they had refused to represent her).
40 Mallen and Smith, 1 Legal Malpractice § 10.25 at 623 (cited in note 1).
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only one of many concerns that courts must balance. Deterring le-
gal malpractice and punishing those guilty of it surely count for
much, and assignees of legal malpractice claims may be the best
parties to advance these ends.
In the end, this issue matters little, as courts can generally
avoid illogic without affecting voluntary assignments. The Jackson
court prescribed unnecessarily strong medicine. It need only have
barred the party who originally opposed the purported victim of
legal malpractice from later bringing that claim to court. Nothing
in the Jackson court's discussion of illogic speaks against assigning
legal malpractice claims to unrelated third parties. The reasoning
,of the Jackson court does not even rule out assigning a legal mal-
practice claim to a former adversary-so long as he receives it
under condition that he sell the claim to a third party rather than
taking it to court himself.
6. Inventing dissatisfaction.
The court in Kracht faced a legal malpractice claim that had
been assigned involuntarily. It objected that under these condi-
tions "a suit could be filed, even though the former client (to
whom the duty was owed) was entirely satisfied with the services
and opposed the filing of a malpractice lawsuit.' 141 But public pol-
icy is best served by aggressively routing out negligent lawyers re-
gardless of how their clients evaluate their services. Otherwise at-
torneys may convince inexperienced clients to accept substandard
legal services.
One might respond that legal malpractice is determined
largely by clients' subjective expectations and therefore cannot be
determined objectively by third parties. This does not describe the
way courts view legal malpractice, however. The standard of proof
for establishing that an attorney's malpractice led to an outcome
detrimental to the client is "what the result should have been (an
objective standard). '
141 268 Cal Rptr at 640.
14,2 Mallen and Smith, 2 Legal Malpractice § 27.7 at 641-42 (cited in note 1) (emphasis
in original). For cases measuring the attorney's duty to a client against the care and skill of
an ordinary reasonable attorney (as opposed to client satisfaction) see, for example, McDan-
iel v Gile, 530 Cal App 3d 363, 281 Cal Rptr 242, 248-49 (1991); Enriquez v Smith, 173 Cal
App 3d 681, 219 Cal Rptr 267, 269 (1985); Glidden v Terranova, 12 Mass App Ct 597, 427
NE2d 1169, 1170 (1981).
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7. Violating the attorney-client privilege.
The Kracht court also objected to allowing the involuntary as-
signment of legal malpractice claims on the grounds that this prac-
tice risked either prejudicing the attorney (by precluding defenses
based on confidential communications) or the client (by letting the
assignee decide to release such information). 143 This is an unusual
objection. It does not surface when courts deal with conventional
types of involuntary assignments, such as those arising by way of
death, bankruptcy, or subrogating insurer. Courts typically allow
the involuntary assignment of legal malpractice claims in such
cases.
1 4 4
Conventional involuntary assignments do not, however, pre-
sent the same risks that attended the assignment before the
Kracht court. The assignee there involuntarily lost his legal mal-
practice claim because his creditor obtained a court order directing
him to assign the claim. In contrast, deceased clients cannot com-
plain if others take up their claims, 145 and clients who enter into
bankruptcy or sign insurance contracts agree to sacrifice their legal
rights in exchange for something they desire more (protection from
creditors or from risks).146 These last three types of assignments
(death, bankruptcy, or subrogating insurer) ought to be called
nonvoluntary. Only assignments like the one in Kracht fully merit
the label involuntary.
Accordingly, the Kracht court's rule against the involuntary
assignment of legal malpractice claims should apply to only a nar-
row range of cases. In those cases the Kracht rationale makes
sense. Courts should not put the confidentiality of attorney-client
relations at risk by exposing them to (truly) involuntary assign-
ments of legal malpractice claims.
This conclusion accords well with previous arguments made on
behalf of voluntary assignability. The benefits of allowing the vol-
143 268 Cal Rptr at 640 n 6.
144 Although in American Employer's Insurance Co. v Medical Protective Co., 165
Mich App 657, 419 NW2d 447 (1988), the court objected that allowing claims to be subro-
gated would make attorneys less zealous advocates, 419 NW2d at 448-49, its argument mir-
rors that of the Jackson court, 258 Cal Rptr at 461, and falls for the same reasons. See text
accompanying notes 128-35.
145 Even if the estate of a deceased client complains on her behalf, the client herself
cannot suffer from having privileged communications aired.
14 Because clients exchanging malpractice claims for such protection do so consensu-
ally, arguments about the advantages of voluntary assignments apply. They may have less
strength here, though, since bankrupt clients usually stand in a disadvantaged bargaining
position and clients seeking insurance may lack information about the value of the future
rights they abandon.
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untary assignment of legal malpractice claims arise from free and
open bargaining, which generates prices that honestly reflect the
value of legal claims at issue. Coercing clients into handing over
their legal malpractice claims would entirely thwart this process.
CONCLUSION
This Comment began by asking whether arguments support-
ing the abandonment of the privity requirement for legal malprac-
tice claims militate in favor of allowing the assignment of such
claims. This question arises from a conflict in the way most courts
have treated privity and assignment in cases of legal malpractice:
they have tended to relax the former while disallowing the latter.
Courts have justified their assault on privity as a means to
provide remedies to the victims of legal malpractice, force attor-
neys to bear the costs of their actions, and deter malpractice in the
future. But lowering the privity bar too far has distinctly negative
effects on the clarity and certainty of legal malpractice rules. Per-
mitting the voluntary assignment of legal malpractice claims, on
the other hand, offers a better means of fulfilling the policy goals
that courts lowering the privity bar have tried to achieve. Courts
have often overlooked the fact that the same arguments they ad-
vance against allowing assignability also apply to relaxing the priv-
ity requirement. Worse yet, they have typically failed to give
proper credit to the considerable advantages that should follow
from the development of a market in legal malpractice claims.
In order to deal with legal malpractice most effectively, courts
need to strike a balance between relaxing privity requirements and
allowing assignability. Equity and public policy support giving in-
tended beneficiaries legal standing to sue for legal malpractice. But
although.lowering the privity bar can get courts started on solving
the problems of legal malpractice, they should not depend on a
change in privity standards to do all the work.
Allowing voluntary assignments of legal malpractice claims
may provide courts with a far better means of fulfilling their policy
goals. They can correct the minor imperfections of voluntary as-
signment by guarding against abuse of the market in legal mal-
practice claims, regulating assignments to former adversaries to
avoid "illogical" claims, and prohibiting truly involuntary assign-
ments that violate the confidentiality of attorney-client relations.
Apart from these caveats, permitting the voluntary assignment of
legal malpractice claims offers considerable advantages. It
promises to provide relief to clients of malpracticing attorneys, to
force irresponsible attorneys to bear the costs of their actions, to
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deter future malpractice, and generally to increase the equity and
efficiency of the legal system.

